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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
JURORS-INTEREST-COMPETENCY FOR TRIAL OF CAUSE WHEN
JUROR IS A MEMBER OF 0RGANIZATION ACTIVE IN INDICTING DE-
FENDANT.-One of the primary duties of every good citizen is that
of obeying our laws and encouraging their obedience. From time
to time, organizations have been formed, having among their ob-
jects, that of detecting crime and furnishing information regard-
ing the violation of our laws to the prosecuting attorney. Such
a practice is unquestionably a worthy one, and no doubt results in
convicting law-breakers Who would otherwise go unpunished. The
question occasionally arises as to whether or not a member of such
an organization is competent to serve as a juror in a case where
his particular local organization has been active in securing infor-
mation against, and indicting the defendant. Such a question
was recently presented to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals in State v. Lohm. The Court held, "When a representa-
tive of an organization at the instance of several members there-
of; procures affidavits and turns them over to the prosecuting at-
torney for use in a particular case, mere membership in such an
organization does not per se disqualify a juror in that case." As
authority for this proposition, Clark v. State2 was cited. This
decision holds, "The rule seems to be settled that the mere mem-
bership in societies or other organizations for the suppression of
crime does not operate as a disqualification of a juror, unless it
is shown that the particular individual has actual bias, or is di-
rectly connected with the matter under investigation in a way that
bias or prejudice will be implied." In Clark v. State the objection
was made to a member of the Ku Klux Klan serving as a juror
because the Miner's Union, of which defendant was a member, had
passed a resolution condemning the Ku Klux Klan. The Court
overruled the objection because it was impertinent. In State v.
Lohm the objection was made because the juror was a member of
the local organization which was active in having the defendant
indicted. The distinction in the facts of the two cases is quite
obvious. It appears that such a situation as accrued in Stat v.
Lohm could be reasonably brought under the exception stated in
the rule of Clark v. State. A West Virginia case, which, in prin-
ciple, is apparently on all fours with State v. Lohm is State v.
Dushman.3 That was a case where an employee of a railway com-
pany was objected to as a juror because his employer had the
1 State v. Lohm, 97 W. Va. 652, 125 S. E. 758 (1924).
Clark v. State, 154 Ark. 592, 243 S. W. 868 (1922).
s State v. Dushman, 79 W. Va. 747, 47 S. E. 166 (1917).
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defendant indicted for stealing brass from the railway company.
The court said, "Though strictly speaking, the railway company
is not actually a party, it is certainly interested in this prosecu-
tion. Its employees would certainly not be competent jurors to
sit in a trial against the defendant. Is it not interested in the re-
sult of this prosecution [so] as to make the reason for the rule
applicable? We are disposed to hold that it is, and that its em-
ployees offered as jurors would presumptively be subject to some
bias or prejudice, or under some control or influence of the cor-
poration." "As a general rule the mere fact that certain persons
are members of an association for the detection of crime, pay
dues, etc., and are liable to assessment by the association, does
not disqualify them as jurors, in the absence of a showing that the
association to which they belong is in some manner connected with
or interested in the prosecution of the particular case." 4  The
Massachusetts Court in Commonwealth v. Moore' held, "A mem-
ber in a voluntary organization formed for the enforcement of laws
against the sale of intoxicating liquors, is incompetent to sit as a
juror in a prosecution for a violation of the liquor laws, where it
appears that the complaint was instituted by an agent of the asso-
ciation. "
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state.6
The real question, of course, is that of determining just what facts
must be present to raise a presumption that a juror will not be
impartial. At common law, the principal causes of challenges
prima facie disqualifying jurors were, (1) kinship to either party
within the ninth degree, (2) that the juror was an arbitrator on
either side, (3) that he has an interest in the cause, (4) that an
action is pending between the juror and either party to the cause,
(5) that the juror has taken money for his verdict, (6) that he
was formerly a juror in the same cause, (7) that he is the party's
master, servant, counsellor, steward, or attorney, or in the same
society or corporation with him; and causes of the same class ofl
founded upon the samie reason should be included.7 Our statute
does not remove these common law disabilities,8 and unless super-
seded by express terms, they remain in force as common law dis-
abilities.' From these common law disabilities and some of the
cases cited, it is seen that the law presumes a great weakness in
4 16 R. C. L. 277, and cases cited. Also see 35 C. J. 332, § 358.
5 Cbmmonwealth v. Moore, 143 Mass. 136, 9 N. E: 25 (1886).
5 U. S. CONST., ART. VI.
I N. 3, supra.
1. N. 3, supra.
0 Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183, 53 L. ed. 465 (1909).
2
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our human make-up. A relative, for example, may most solemnly
swear upon his voir dire that he is wholly free from. bias, preju-
dice or interest, and will a true verdict render, according to the
law and the evidence. Interest, however, will be presumed, and
prevails as a disqualification over the juror's oath. A member
of an organization, active in indicting the defendant, can be pre-
sumed to possess the following interests which would tend to ren-
der him an incompetent juror: first, he possesses class feeling ac-
quired by being a member of any organization; second, he is in
sympathy with the objects of his organization; third, he may be
under the control of his organization, or bound by secret prom-
ises; fourth, there is the fear of failing to render a verdict not in
accord with the wishes. of his brother members; fifth, he may have
been present in the meetings in which the defendant was discuss-
ed.
The object of the law is, in all cases in which jurors are imipan-
eled to try the issue, to secure men for that responsible duty whose
minds are wholly free from bias or prejudice.10 A big part of the
battle is the selection of the jury, and an impartial jury is the
corner-stone of the fairness of trial by jury.1 Just where to draw
the line in determining whether or not a juror will be impartial
is a matter of much conjecture. However, as there is no alarm-
ing shortage of jury material in our country at the present time,
the best policy would seem to be that of giving the defendant the
benefit of the doubt when there is a strong presumption that the
juror may be an interested party.
-J. J. G., JR.
20 State v. Hatfield, 48 W. Va. 561, 37 S. El. 626 (1900).
2 Melson v. Dickson, 63 Ga. 682, 36 Am. Rep. 128 (1879).
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